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How Much Can Governments Borrow? Financialization 
and Emerging Markets Government Borrowing Capacity 
Iain Hardie 
Politics and International Relations 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
How much can governments borrow from private markets? This question goes to the 
heart of the debate regarding the impact of financial globalization on government 
policy (see Cohen, 1996; Ocapmo and Stiglitz, 2008). Government debt ‘provides a 
most likely location for the operation of financial market pressures’ (Mosley, 2003 
p.17; italics in original). Investors reward or punish governments for policy decisions 
directly through the cost and availability of financing. The more a government can 
borrow, the greater its immediate ability to carry out its chosen policies. Borrowing 
capacity has been seen as crucial to the outcome of both World War One (Frieden, 
2006 p.131) and the Cold War (Ferguson, 2001 p.406). Even in less confrontational 
times, government debt is not only a transfer of resources between generations but 
potentially between successive governments. ‘Eventually the debt would have to be 
repaid. For a politician, however, eventually is a long time, certainly farther in the 
future than the next election’ (Frieden, 2006 p.381; also Allen and Gale 1994; Geddes 
1994).   
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Despite the temptation for politicians in borrowing, the levels of government debt 
vary markedly. In the 31 middle income ‘emerging market’ countries in the ‘EMBI 
Global’, an index of emerging market bonds, the ratio of  government international 
debt to GDP in 2006 ranges from Lebanon’s 85.7 percent to China’s 1.5 percent of 
GDP (IMF, 2006f p.34). For domestic debt, the 23 countries in the ‘EMLI+’ (a local 
currency debt index) ranges from Singapore’s 102.7 percent1 (IMF, 2006d p.26) to 
Hong Kong’s 1.0 per cent (IMF, 2006e p.23). While very low levels of debt are the 
result only of government decisions, at higher levels, it is a question of how much 
lenders will finance (Frieden 1991; Reinhart et al., 2003). Private lenders (for 
governments, overwhelmingly bond market investors) will obviously lend only when 
they believe the debt will be repaid. Their concern is debt sustainability. Sustainability 
is, however, difficult to analyse precisely (IMF, 2002). The interest rate paid is a key 
component on any calculation, and debt sustainability is therefore most questioned at 
times of rapidly rising interest rates. For many emerging market countries, the 
possibility of such ‘debt crises’ – culminating in markets no longer financing 
governments – is a constant concern, particularly for ’debt intolerant’ countries, with 
a history of default and high inflation, where crises can occur at relatively low levels 
of indebtedness (Reinhart et al., 2003).  
 
The international financial institutions have well-established views on minimizing the 
risk of such crises:  increase demand for government bonds, and maximise the 
stability of that demand, by attracting investors with the broadest range of opinions 
(IMF, 2003). This reduces yields, and, by increasing the likelihood of sellers and 
buyers meeting, reduces volatility. Government bond markets should therefore be as 
liquid as possible. Investors should be able to follow the broadest range of investment 
 3 
strategies, including short selling, and be able to reverse those strategies easily. In 
brief, governments should increase the ability of investors to trade risk. 
 
This article examines these views and resultant policy recommendations. Does 
increasing the ability of investors to trade in emerging government bond markets – 
defined here as increasing financialization – enhance or diminish the ability of 
governments to borrow? It concludes that the more (less) financialized an emerging 
government bond market, the lower (higher) the capacity of governments to borrow 
on a sustainable basis. In emerging markets, financialized markets are debt intolerant 
markets. The article examines two issues: the varied levels of debt-to-GDP that 
different emerging market governments have sustained, and the way bond markets 
have reacted to situations that precipitated, or could have precipitated,  a ‘debt crisis’.  
 
Financialization 
 
Financialization, it is argued here, undermines sustainable borrowing by increasing 
the cost of that borrowing (on financial liberalization increasing Turkish interest rates, 
see Aricanli and Rodrik 1990) and making financial crises more likely and more 
severe. This article can therefore be seen as sharing the post-Keynesian view of 
financial liberalization as resulting in increased volatility (see Grabel 1995; on 
Brazilian liberalization of capital outflows, de Paula, 2008; Gottschalk and Sodré, 
2008), and an increased likelihood of crisis. By utilizing financialization as the 
independent variable, however, the article moves beyond considering only 
liberalization. 
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Financialization is defined here as the ability to trade risk; both taking and trading the 
risk on the performance of an asset. Securities markets are designed to allow the 
buying and selling of various types of risk, but the ability to do so - the liquidity of 
individual markets (e.g., Carruthers and Stinchcombe 1990) - varies considerably. 
Furthermore, the ability of an individual investor to trade risk in a particular market is 
a function not only of the financialization of the government bond market structure 
(i.e., the constraints on the trading of risk in the particular market), but also of the 
financialization of the investor (i.e., his/her own ability to trade risk). Individuals’ 
ability to trade risk, for example, is constrained even in the most liquid market. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated below, the financialization of the investors that 
dominate a particular market will interact with the financialization of the formal 
market structure to determine the ability of all investors to trade risk in that market. 
The ability to trade risk is low in a market that consists of a single financial product 
and where the majority of the outstanding securities are owned by banks and pension 
funds that hold those securities until they are repaid. In contrast, financialization is 
high in a market with a broad range of financial products and with the heavy 
involvement of short-term trading-orientated investors aiming to buy and sell 
frequently. More (less) financialized investors are likely to increase (decrease) the 
financialization of market structure and more financialized markets attract more 
financialized investors, but structure and actors can usefully be considered separately.    
 
The importance of the ability of investors to trade risk (focused on ease of exit for 
international investors) has been highlighted previously (e.g., Maxfield, 1997, p.37), 
as has the distinction between ‘patient’ and ‘impatient’ capital (Cohen, 1996 p.284; 
Kahler, 1998 p.10; Sobel, 1999 p.22; Bryant 2003 p.43). Maxfield (1998) considers 
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the relative patience of different international investor types. This study develops 
Maxfield’s approach: first, by focusing on differences in the actual ownership of 
government bonds, demonstrating both the variety in ownership patterns and the role 
of domestic investors, even in international bonds. Second, the study highlights 
differences between investors of the same type, focusing on domestic commercial 
banks and individual investors. Third, a focus on the ability to trade risk, rather than 
solely on exit, highlights the importance of short selling. 
   
Financialization is rarely used in IPE (although see Epstein, 2005a). The 
financialization literature itself lacks an agreed definition. Ertürk et al. (2008) 
highlight four broad approaches (also Epstein 2005b, p.3; Krippner, 2005, p.181; 
French et al., 2008). A wide range of topics are now discussed within this literature 
(see Engelen, 2008), but the focus has been almost exclusively on the developed 
economies. Comparative studies outside Europe and North America are especially 
lacking. The ability to trade risk is a narrower definition, but one that encompasses the 
central processes of ‘[t]echnological change, regulatory change, and institutional 
change’ (Rajan, 2005, p.331)2 in financial markets in both developed and emerging 
market countries. Such changes all concern the increasing ability of financial market 
actors to take and trade risk (on the U.S., see Crotty 2008). This article also highlights 
change amongst, and differences between, domestic banks. Aglietta and Breton 
(2001) recognise changes as banks add a ‘new market portfolio’ to their ‘traditional 
credit portfolio’ (2001 p.441; see also Ertürk and Solari, 2007; Froud et al., 2007). 
Again, at the heart of such changes is the increasing ability to trade risk. 
 
Case Study Countries 
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The article considers three case study countries: Brazil, Lebanon and Turkey. They 
are selected from those emerging market countries with government debt that is high 
enough to cause possible market debt constraints. A ‘most different’ selection 
approach is used. The countries are very different across a range of variables, 
including most importantly the independent variable in the study, the ability to trade 
risk in their government bond markets. A comparison of the countries is shown in 
Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Brazil ranks amongst the world’s ten largest economies, has a relatively sophisticated 
financial system (Gleizer 1995, p.223; Carvalho and Garcia, 2006), and was, in 
February 2004, the largest component (i.e., has the largest volume of liquid bonds 
outstanding) of the EMBI Global index. Lebanon has in recent history endured a full 
range of misfortunes. For many international investors, a cursory look at investing in 
its bonds shows yields that are far too low relative to similarly creditworthy countries. 
‘[R]atings lower than [Lebanon at the time of the research] are usually reserved for 
countries that are already in default’ (Moody’s analyst, quoted by Daily Star, 5 July 
2007). The financialization of Turkey’s financial market structure and market actors 
lies between Brazil and Lebanon, as Turkey does on many variables. Turkey is the 
fourth largest EMBI constituent. Both Brazil and Turkey have the extensive history of 
default and inflation that is seen as making them able to safely sustain only a low 
level of external debt (Reinhart et al., 2003). Lebanon has suffered periods of high 
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inflation. Aside from their position as potential emerging market bond investment 
destinations, these are three very different countries.  
 
We would reasonably expect that the higher a country’s credit rating and the more 
sophisticated its financial markets, the more a government would be able to borrow. 
However, in the case study countries, the opposite is the case. Net public sector debt-
to-GDP from 1996-2006 in the three countries is set out in Figure 1: 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
There is also a marked difference in the levels of government indebtedness that have 
resulted in a debt crisis. Most formal analyses of government debt crisis have defined 
crisis as default (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). However, situations where 
governments have been unable to borrow from private market actors, and have been 
forced to turn to the IMF are also crises (with or without simultaneous currency 
and/or banking crises), and are important to understanding government borrowing 
capacity. In the run up to the 2002 presidential elections (the peak in Brazil’s debt 
levels above), Brazil was considered to be in a ‘death spiral’ (Krugman, 2002 p.2), 
and the Financial Times (15 October 2002) concluded: ‘At current market rates, even 
an optimist would admit Brazil is insolvent’. The economist Barry Eichengreen 
forecast default (Santiso 2004 p.23), which an IMF programme possibly pre-empted. 
Turkey’s peak, in the 2001 financial crisis, also necessitated an IMF programme and 
an exceptional 6.5 percent of GDP primary surplus, but only after far higher 
government debt levels were reached. The contrast with Lebanon is even more 
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dramatic: ‘For years now, Lebanon has been able to sustain a government debt-to-
GDP ratio which is well beyond levels deemed sustainable’ (IMF, 2006a p.28). 
 
This higher level of sustainable debt is closely linked to relatively low and stable bond 
yields. Figure 2 below shows the US dollar yields of the three case study countries’ 
EMBI components since 1998: 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
The greater volatility of Brazilian bonds and the lower volatility of Lebanese bonds 
are clear, as is the extended periods of higher Brazilian and lower Lebanese yields. 
The highest rated country, with the lowest level of government indebtedness and the 
most financialized markets, has seen both generally higher yields and the most 
dramatic spikes in borrowing costs.       
 
Analysing Financialization 
       
Financialization, as defined here, could be measured by the volumes of trading in 
government bonds, on the assumption that there will be more trading in markets 
where that trading is easier. The data certainly confirm the differences between the 
markets, both in the absolute volume of trading and in turnover relative to each 
market’s size. In 2007, Brazilian domestic bonds were the second most actively traded 
in the emerging markets (Emerging Market Trade Association [‘EMTA’] 20073). 
Brazilian international bonds were the most actively traded. Turkey’s domestic bond 
market was the fourth most actively traded by volume in 2007. The international 
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bonds were the sixth most active. Total trading volumes in the survey for Lebanon 
were only US$7,724 million for international bonds and US$806 million for domestic 
bonds. Data for individual bonds confirm these differences. The most actively traded 
international bond, ‘the industry’s benchmark’ and ‘everybody’s favourite short’4 was 
a Brazilian US$-denominated bond maturing in 2040, with a trading volume 93 times 
its issue size.  Four Brazilian bonds appear in the top ten most actively traded. 
Turkey’s most traded international bond was the third most actively traded, a volume 
42 times its issue size, while the most actively traded Lebanese international bond had 
a trading volume only just over a quarter its issue size.  
 
Such data support the claim of differential financialization across government bond 
markets, but does not explain those differences. In particular, it obscures the detail of 
the workings of individual markets, and the processes of change. This risks an 
overemphasis on financial liberalization at the expense of other important reasons for 
change. Regulation is not the only influence on investor decision making, even in 
heavily regulated areas. In Brazil, for example, banks’ voluntary holdings of 
government bonds are three times their holdings required by regulation.5 Furthermore, 
change brought about by technological advances, financial innovation and changing 
business practices can be independent of regulatory change and may undermine 
regulation. Financial innovation undermined Brazilian capital controls (Carvalho and 
Garcia 2006), for example. '[I]mproving the technical efficiency of markets may 
actually be a contributory factor to the frequency of currency crises in the 1990s’ 
(Krugman 1997), and before 2008 ‘many problems were hidden in the “plumbing” of 
the financial markets” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009 p.221), so a greater focus on this 
plumbing is needed.      
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Internationalization (increased foreign ownership of bond and equity markets or 
banks) also represents important change, but unless changes in domestic financial 
markets always result from the adoption of international practices, a focus on 
internationalization risks missing changes in domestic actors and markets. In Brazil, 
domestic private banks had a competitive advantage over foreign banks in treasury 
operations and technology (Stallings, 2006 p.245), and both Brazil and Lebanon have 
seen recent periods of declining foreign ownership of banks. A lack of attention on 
domestic markets and financial market actors is a weakness in IPE’s consideration of 
financial markets (Sobel, 1999 p.206), and in the analysis of government debt 
generally (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Financialization, as defined here, considers 
internationalization, liberalization and other changes in financial systems, and 
considers domestic and international markets together.  
 
This article considers first which investors own government bonds in the three 
countries. There are significant limitations in the available statistics, so quantitative 
data are supplemented by interview data.6 The influences on the two central groups of 
investors, domestic commercial banks and individuals, are then analysed, focusing 
both on the investors themselves and the market structure in which they operate. A 
comparative event study then considers crucial periods of financial crisis, or potential 
crisis, to demonstrate how investor behaviour has influenced the outcome of such 
events. Last, the conclusion considers both the generalizability of the findings and the 
implications for government policy towards, and academic study of, financial 
markets. 
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Who Owns Government Bonds?    
 
Table 1 shows ownership by investor type in the domestic government bond markets 
(excluding ownership by government entities, including central banks) at end-2006. 
Table 2 covers the international markets. Domestic bonds are those bonds issued in 
the respective home countries and governed by domestic law. Most such bonds are 
denominated in the domestic currency. International bonds are issued outside the 
country of the borrower, are governed by the laws of another country than the issuer 
and are nearly all denominated in currencies other than the issuing country’s own.  
 
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 here] 
  
In Lebanon, over three-quarters of domestic and international government bonds are 
owned by domestic commercial banks. Domestic individual investors own much of 
the remainder, with domestic and international institutional investors barely involved. 
In Turkey, domestic banks and individuals own over half the domestic government 
bonds and over 40 percent of international bonds. Domestic mutual and pension funds 
are not yet significant investors. There are no domestic Turkish hedge funds. 
International investors are significant in both domestic and international markets, 
owning just less than 20 and over 50 percent respectively. The Brazilian domestic 
market has a broad range of financial market actors. Banks and domestic institutional 
investors, including mutual, pension and hedge funds are all active, with domestic 
individuals’ and international involvement low. Estimates of domestic ownership of 
Brazilian international bond markets ranged from 25 to 40 percent, but there was 
considerable uncertainty, even amongst Ministry of Finance officials.7 
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Domestic Banks and Individual Investors   
 
Domestic banks, and to a lesser extent individual investors, are central to the ability of 
emerging market governments to borrow. The next section will consider the 
influences on these investors. Market structure will be discussed, but also the 
constraints on the ability to trade risk that result from the nature of investors. First, the 
ability to exit is considered, including both situations when exit is effectively 
impossible, and when constraints on exit (including exit via hedging) fall within the 
more conventional analysis of transaction costs. Shorting is considered next. The 
focus on the ability to trade risk highlights that it is not only the ability to exit, but 
also the ability to short, that are important to borrowing capacity.  Shorting, selling 
securities one does not already own, is not exit, as the investor maintains an interest in 
the price of the security, but is also not the same as remaining invested. Finally, the 
question of investor capacity if considered, as investor behaviour is obviously only 
important if those investors have the capacity to influence markets. The question of 
capacity, however, is not only concerned with the size of investors, but with how their 
performance is measured. The way in which the investment behaviour of banks and 
individuals has been important in crisis and potential crisis situations is then examined 
by way of a comparative event study, examining the actions of domestic commercial 
banks and individual investors in the three countries at specific periods.  
  
Market Structure    
 
This analysis begins with the structure of the markets, and its influence on ‘liquidity’. 
A complete analysis of all factors that influence the structure of markets, or of all the 
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risks that banks face, is beyond the scope of this article, but examples that indicate 
significant differences between the three countries are chosen. The Brazilian 
Mercantile and Futures Exchange (‘BM&F’) is central to the high financialization of 
the Brazilian market. The exchange trades futures and options, including on interest 
rates and currencies, and is ‘ten times more liquid maybe’ than the government bond 
market,8 ‘so everybody that wants to take a sizeable position goes to the futures 
market’.9 This represents ‘the biggest difference you have from other emerging 
economies’.10 Without the derivatives market, aggressive short-term trading on 
Brazilian interest rates could not take place in such volumes; nor could risk be 
efficiently hedged. One of the largest private banks completes about 90 percent of its 
hedging through the BM&F,11 and this ability to hedge exposure allows exit without 
selling bonds. In Turkey, with a less developed derivatives market, its further 
development would, for one bank, ‘fundamentally change the way I’m running my 
portfolio’.12 
 
The BM&F is a private sector initiative. However, private sector actors can also 
inhibit the financialization of the market structure. Lebanese banks have a ‘tacit 
agreement’ not to lend government bonds,13 despite lending being in itself profitable. 
This agreement limits the financialization of the government securities market, by 
preventing short sellers from borrowing bonds (see Committee on the Global 
Financial System, 2007 p.54). A Lebanese banker is explicit regarding the motivation 
for the agreement:  
 
‘When I get calls from [an American bank], looking for a trade to short 
Lebanese pounds I will do everything I can, not only not to facilitate it but to 
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make sure he doesn’t do it with anybody else as well. I’m not in it for short 
term profit, I’m in it for going with the grain’.14 
 
Lebanese and Turkish banks gain little from facilitating such financialization, as it 
pushes down the price of the bonds they hold, and they cannot exploit it: ‘it wasn’t 
very interesting for us to create some more volatility on this market’.15   
 
Limited bond lending not only limits overall trading activity, it also makes the 
development of a credit derivatives market more difficult (see below). Credit 
derivatives (most commonly, credit default swaps [‘CDS’]) are ‘financial contracts 
that allow the transfer of credit risk from one market participant to another’ (Bomfim, 
2005 p.4). Effectively, a buyer of a CDS is buying tradable insurance against default. 
CDS increase financialization, in part by facilitating shorting.  
   
The financialization of the market structure, important as it is, must also be combined 
with the financialization of investors. It is the financialization of domestic banks and 
individual investors that is considered next, focusing on the ability to exit. 
 
Ability to Exit 
 
The ability to exit is central to the analysis of a broad range of issues in political 
economy. In the study of financial markets, however, there is rarely any consideration 
of an absolute inability to exit, and even then only as the result of legislation. Here, 
however, in the specific case of the domestic banks, the analysis goes beyond the 
costs of exit, to consider the situation where ‘full exit is impossible’ (Hirschman 
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1970, p.100). This unusual situation can lead to ‘loyalty’. As will be shown below, 
this loyalty does not have to be ‘enforced’ by regulation (Cohen, 1998 p.132), and 
varies across the three countries. 
 
Banks’ inability to exit can result from their large holdings of government securities, 
relative both to the size of the market and to their total assets, and from their inability 
to exit, short of closing completely, their domestic business generally. The size of 
bank holdings severely limits their ability to exit. In Turkey, the large banks cannot 
sell more than about US$300 million equivalent in a day, with one concluding they 
could not sell their portfolio in a year.16 Similarly, Lebanese banks wanting to sell are 
faced with everyone also trying to sell, and maintain their holdings for fear of pushing 
down prices.17 A US$20 million trade in Lebanese international bonds could move the 
market 1--2 percent in price. In a period of great uncertainty, such as after the 
assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri (see below), US$5 million would be 
sufficient. In the domestic bonds, LBP20 billion (US$13.3 million) is a large trade.18 
This practical impossibility of exit goes beyond transaction costs. As far as larger 
banks are concerned, they cannot sell. 
 
In addition, a high percentage of the banks’ total assets are government bonds: in 
Brazil 27, in Turkey 51 and in Lebanon 54 percent. The majority of Lebanese 
interviewees believed a default by the government would lead to the collapse of the 
banking system. ‘If the government defaults, we default’.19 Even if banks decide to 
limit their risk on the government by buying fewer bonds, their exposure to the 
Lebanese banking system and the economy is effectively the same risk.20 This is a 
risk the market structure means they cannot even partially hedge. Turkish 
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interviewees disagreed on whether a government default would lead to the insolvency 
of their bank, but some consider that diversifying to private sector lending offers no 
protection.21 The size of the banks’ holdings, and their exposure to the bond market 
and the economy more generally, has a significant (but across the three countries 
varied) influence on their investment decisions. Specific examples of bank behaviour 
are discussed below, but the attitude of the Lebanese banks is particularly noteworthy: 
‘at least I have to keep…what I already have with the government...and if the 
government...needs some money, I have to give it’.22 Brazilian banks own a smaller 
proportion of the market, and, as discussed above, the more financialized market 
structure gives more hedging and trading options. They still face the difficulty of their 
entire business being exposed to the economic cost of a government default, but the 
ability to exit is higher.  
 
When the option to exit exists, the costs of exit have a significant impact. For 
emerging market investors, the costs of that exit are high. Transaction costs are 
particularly onerous for individuals but also for smaller institutions. Larger 
institutions, with greater sums to invest, can better meet these costs, many of which 
are fixed and substantial.23 Banks in emerging market countries are relatively small, 
and the three case study countries show considerable variation (see table 1 above). 
The result is a varied capacity to meet the costs of trading risks other than government 
bonds.  
 
The range of alternative investments has an important influence on the costs of exit. 
The narrower these alternatives (the lower the investor’s ability to trade risk) and the 
lower their return, the more costly exit may prove. The usual alternative to 
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government bonds for banks in an emerging market is lending, other government 
bonds or inter-bank deposits. On US dollar deposits (allowed in both Lebanon and 
Turkey), banks frequently pay interest higher than either US government bonds or 
bank deposits with international banks. They cannot profitably expand their balance 
sheets on that basis. The yields on US dollar bonds issued by the Lebanese and 
Turkish governments, however, generally yield higher than deposit rates. For 
individual investors, the main alternative to government bonds is this lower interest 
on bank deposits. International investors, in contrast, can trade a broader range of 
risks, and compare an emerging market government’s debt to the (possibly higher 
yielding) debt of other governments.  
 
How those returns are measured also has an influence. On one level, this is the 
different timeframe for investment highlighted by the distinction between patient and 
impatient capital. In this framework, banks and individuals are usually seen as buyers 
of short term assets. Short maturity borrowing is seen as undermining debt 
sustainability, because of the need to refinance.  Individuals in the three countries, 
however, not only expect to hold bonds until maturity 24 (although see Stallings, 2006 
p. 126; Borensztein et al., 2006 p.8 on Latin America), but are also likely to 
reinvest.25 Lebanese and Turkish banks are in a similar position, and also buy longer 
dated bonds, especially in foreign currencies. 
 
The detail of how performance is measured is also important, however. For banks, 
International Accounting Standard 39 (see Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 2006) gives 
three ways to account for government bond holdings: as trading, ‘available for sale’, 
or investment.  In the investment book, profit is calculated on an accruals basis. A 
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bond bought with a yield of 10 percent p.a. will show an income of that yield until the 
bond is repaid, regardless of market movements (absent, of course, substantial credit 
deterioration). The important point here is that bonds cannot be sold from the 
investment book (except usually for five percent of the total investment book holding 
p.a.) without the entire investment book being revalued at prevailing market rates. In a 
weak market, this limits the ability to trade risk. Interviewees indicated they would 
only sell from the investment account in the most extreme circumstances. The 
investment book is ‘a small accounting thing but it changes everything in the way of 
running business and it changes incentives to buy and sell at specific times’.26 Bank 
investors, within their investment portfolio, are long term ‘buy and hold’ investors. 
The international investors interviewed are generally taking views for a maximum of 
three to six months, with some even more short term.27 In contrast, in the investment 
book: ‘my 30 year bonds will never come back within the next 30 years’.28 Banks, 
generally seen as buyers of short-term government securities, are buying bonds up to 
30 years in maturity on a ‘buy and hold’ basis. 
 
Ability to Short 
 
Consideration solely of the ability to exit is insufficient in modern financial markets. 
Many investors can now short. Both legislation and market structure will influence 
the ability to ‘go short’, but a major influence is also the investment mandates and 
decisions of investors. The focus here is on banks (individuals in the three countries 
had few possibilities to take short positions).   
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Banks can introduce proprietary trading operations, in addition to more traditional 
treasury functions. A focus on capital gains then becomes more likely. As far as 
Lebanese and large Turkish banks are concerned, the treasury function still 
dominates.29 For smaller Turkish banks, and most importantly for the Brazilian banks, 
trading is relatively more significant. Brazilian private banks accounted for over two-
thirds of their holdings of government bonds as ‘trading’ in December 2005. The 
equivalent Turkish figure is 13.7 percent.30 International interviewees also note this 
Brazilian focus on trading.31 
 
If Lebanese or Turkish banks tried to short securities in large size, other banks would 
know, 32 and could exploit the situation, for example by ‘squeezing’ the price of the 
shorted security higher.33 This is a result of both the large holdings of government 
bonds by these banks and the market structure. The situation for banks in both 
countries is similar, despite only Lebanese banks facing a regulatory prohibition on 
shorting. Thanks largely to the BM&F, Brazilian banks can short, and proprietary 
traders at the larger Brazilian private banks, trading solely to make profits on their 
own books, will do so.34 These proprietary trading desks act in a very similar way to 
hedge funds. In contrast, at a Turkish bank with a proprietary trading desk, the limits 
on trading are kept low, because traders might work against the interests of the larger 
bank portfolio of government bonds.35 As one Turkish banker observed, ‘I can’t act 
like a hedge fund’.36  
 
Investor Capacity 
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Investors are only important if they have sufficient capacity to influence markets. This 
capacity is also important to Hirschman’s conception of loyalty, because, to remain 
invested when market prices are in danger of falling, loyal investors must believe that 
their remaining will make a difference to prices; they must be ‘quality makers’ 
(Hirschman 1970, p.99).  
 
Capacity is partly a question of the amounts investors can invest, relative to the 
government’s need for financing. Bank assets to GDP are far higher in Lebanon than 
Turkey, which is in turn higher than Brazil (see table 1). This, in itself, has a 
significant impact on government borrowing capacity. However, the willingness of 
investors to buy government bonds, especially in periods of market weakness, is also 
influenced by performance measurement or accounting issues, especially the ability to 
avoid marking to market. For individual investors, such performance measurement 
issues do not exist. They buy and hold government bonds as they would make a time 
deposit. They can therefore be significant buyers when other investors stay on the 
sidelines (see below), and not sell when others exit. 
 
Banks can act similarly, because of the investment book. First, existing holdings can 
be moved into the investment book to avoid actual or potential losses: ‘the losing 
position[s] generally find their way in[to] investment portfolios’.37 Bonds can also be 
purchased during severe market weakness (see Allen and Gale, 2000 p.271). Some 
banks in Lebanon and Turkey bought bonds in periods of serious market stress 
because the investment account meant they did not face losses if prices fell further. 
For one bank, all the bonds in the investment account, 14 percent of the portfolio, had 
been purchased at such times.38 The investment book is heavily used by government-
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owned banks in Brazil and Turkey, but even for domestic private banks, it represented 
7.2 and 16.5 percent of securities holdings at the end of 2005 respectively.39  
 
For banks, financialization also includes the ability to borrow to finance assets, so 
removing constraints on risk-taking from the availability of customer deposits. 
Financing comes mainly from inter-bank borrowing or through the repurchase 
(‘repo’) market. This short-term financing of longer-term assets results in a high 
vulnerability to market movements, the opposite of the situation with the investment 
book. In extreme situations, banks are similar to hedge funds. This vulnerability was 
exposed amongst the smaller Turkish banks in 2000 (Alper 2001).    
 
Domestic Banks and Individual Investors in Crisis Situations 
 
How then have banks and individuals behaved in practice? To consider this, the next 
section undertakes a comparative event study, comparing the reactions of markets in 
the three countries to situations where shocks could have led, or did lead, to financial 
crisis. The focus is on the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 
Lebanon, the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey, the 1998-99 crisis in Brazil, the result of 
contagion from a Russian default that should have had a similar impact on all three 
countries (if not a greater impact on geographically proximate countries), and the 
2002 crisis induced by market fears about the presidential victory of the left wing 
Lula da Silva. All these time periods are covered in figure 2 above, and the striking 
weakness of Brazil in both relevant periods, and the lower yields at which Turkish, 
and particularly Lebanese, bonds peaked are immediately apparent. In each event, the 
range of possible outcomes, including an IMF programme or, in Lebanon’s case, 
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bilateral support, are similar. All three countries are vulnerable to shocks, both 
internal and external, leading to financial crisis, and such shocks should have a 
negative impact on bond market yields. However, it would be reasonable to expect 
that the higher-rated and less indebted a country, the less likely it would be to face 
crisis, and the more diverse the investor base in a market, the less severe that crisis 
would be. The experiences of the three countries question those assumptions. While 
the diverse nature of the ‘triggers’ for actual or potential crisis present some 
difficulties for comparison, contagion from the Russian default should be a concern 
for all three countries. Furthermore, the peaceful transition to a left-wing President in 
Brazil should have a lesser impact than the murder of Lebanon’s most high profile 
politician and the resultant political crisis. Additional support is also provided by 
events not analysed in detail here, but discussed more briefly below.            
 
Hariri’s Assassination 
 
Rafik Hariri, former Prime Minister and opponent of Syria’s presence in Lebanon, 
was assassinated in February 2005. Reacting to enormous political uncertainty, local 
bank depositors switched US$5.5 billion from Lebanese pounds to US dollars; 
Lebanese pound resident deposits declined by 33.2 percent by the end of March. 
Simultaneously, US$2 billion left the country (IMF, 2006b p.6.); total non-resident 
deposits fell by 11.7 percent.40 This threatened the main anchor of the Lebanese 
government’s economic policy, the effective fixing since 1993 of the pound to the US 
dollar.  
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The banks reacted in three important ways that assisted the central bank’s crisis 
management. They did not exit, as might be expected. Regulation prevents Lebanese 
banks from running any significant currency mismatch. Therefore, they reacted to the 
changes in their deposits by selling Lebanese pound securities to Banque du Liban, 
and exchanged the pounds received for US dollars, again with the central bank, the 
only buyer supporting the Lebanese currency. This depleted the central bank’s foreign 
currency reserves. The risk-averse strategy, of placing the US dollars outside the 
country, was available in a country without capital controls. However, the US dollars 
were instead placed on deposit with the Banque du Liban. ‘[I]f we had really done 
what theoretically…a risk averse person would have done, definitely [the currency] 
would have collapsed’. The decision to keep the deposits with the Banque du Liban 
was the result of ‘persuasion’.41 Central bank foreign currency reserves, lost 
supporting the currency, were replenished as banks deposited their US dollars. Gross 
reserves fell, but were maintained at close to US$8 billion (IMF, 2006b p.7). 
Meanwhile, the central bank’s net foreign exchange liquidity42 fell close to zero. The 
banks also accepted swaps to lengthen the maturities of government and central bank 
debt (ibid., p.6), when in similar situations (for example, Brazil in 2002) investors 
would be expected to reduce the maturities of their exposure. Overall, there was ‘tight 
[Banque du Liban] – banks cooperation’ (Bank Audi, 2005a p.2). The exposure of the 
banks to the government (including Banque du Liban) increased in the first quarter of 
2005, and the government continued financing (Bank Audi, 2005b). The spreads of 
international government bonds actually fell over the same period (Bank Audi, 2005a 
p.10).  
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Second, the banks encouraged depositors to remain calm. ‘Banks’ managements were 
responsible for briefing branch managers so they could help avoid customer panic, 
which would have led to uncontrolled demand for dollars against Lebanese pounds. 
This proved successful’ (Standard & Poor’s, 2006).43 Third, the decision not to lend 
securities limited short selling and CDS activity. On the day after Hariri’s death, 
despite the great uncertainty, one international trader (interviewed 18 February 2005, 
4 days after the assassination) saw only one CDS trade taking place in the market.  
 
Individual investors were also important. To replenish its foreign exchange reserves, 
the central bank in April 2005 issued a 10 year Certificate of Deposit, a tradable 
security similar to a bond. This borrowing was launched at a period of considerable 
uncertainty (although the worst appeared past), but sold in substantial volumes to 
individual investors. This contributed to an issue size of US$2 billion, equal to the fall 
in gross reserves, and more than the central bank expected.44 The reason was the high 
return compared to the alternative of bank deposits. ‘[W]e had unbelievable demand 
by [individual investors], because it’s paying…10 percent coupon, yield 10½…we 
had demand in 50, 60, 70 million dollars, probably, if not more [US$10-20 million 
would be expected]’.45 At the time, bank deposits paid 3.5--4.5 percent.46 Critics 
claim the interest rate was higher than necessary,47 but despite Lebanon being rated a 
low B3/B-, and recently downgraded by Moody’s,48 the country was able to borrow 
US$2 billion at a time of economic and political uncertainty (albeit also some 
optimism after the Syrian withdrawal) and at an acceptable interest rate.. This was 
thanks to unfinancialized individual investors. Brazilian bonds yields in 2002 
exceeded 25 percent, and Turkish yields in 2001 exceeded 15 percent (see figure 2 
above).  
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Turkey’s 2001 Crisis 
 
Turkey’s 2001 financial crisis saw severe weakness in currency and bond markets 
(Akyüz and Boratav, 2005; Altunιşιk and Tür, 2005). Turkish banks ordinarily lend 
government securities, but some stopped lending at this time,49 in order to limit 
shorting. Six banks also decided to intervene directly in the foreign exchange market, 
forming a fund to buy Turkish lira in the market, as a central bank would in 
supporting the currency.50 Their motivation came from their inability, unlike foreign 
investors, to fully exit: ‘we…have [a] branch network and…lots of customers, 
meaning if Turkey gets hit more, we as banks also get hit more…whereas for the 
foreign banks present in Turkey it’s just a trading game’.51 This cooperation between 
the six banks was not the result of government pressure, regulatory or otherwise.52 
Interviewees disagreed on the success of this operation, and other banks may have 
been acting differently,53 but a group of important banks saw it as in their interests to 
support the market in the face of foreign selling: ‘if you are in a small community, in 
certain cases…we get together and say okay this is not for the bank, this is for 
Turkey’.54 
 
Individual investors were also important in Turkey in 2001, and caught even the 
domestic banks by surprise. There were fears regarding the government’s ability to 
raise financing, but individual investors were attracted by the high interest rates, and 
ensured successful auctions.55 Individual investors bought when even domestic banks 
would not. The banks, initially unwilling to finance the government, then followed 
their individual investors, confident of a successful auction. Individual investors 
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‘supported the Treasury more than the banks did’.56 The very high real interest rates 
involved in attracting individuals, 50--70 percent, were unsustainable in the medium 
term, but the success of these auctions helped avert an even costlier crisis. As in 
Lebanon, unfinancialized individual investors were central to the government’s ability 
to borrow. 
 
Brazil in 1998-99 and 2002. 
 
The contrast with Brazil is marked. In 1999, after the Asian and Russian crises, the 
government was forced to devalue a previously pegged currency and turn to the IMF. 
The 2002 presidential elections saw even greater falls in bond prices (see figure 2 
above). In contrast to Lebanon and Turkey, many banks chose either to hedge their 
risk or to place bets on further price falls, and in a financialized market were able to 
do so: ‘On the devaluation, 1999, every bank was very long dollars and every bank 
made a lot of money.’ In 2002, ‘we were short the currency, hedging some 
exposures’57 The largest Brazilian banks remain ‘married to the country’,58 and could 
not shield themselves entirely from the consequences of an economic collapse caused 
by a government debt default.  In 2002, a number of the larger banks did buy when 
the market was weak, and profited as a result.59 Some banks discussed trying to 
support the market, but the central bank, not believing this was a solution, would not 
change the rules on marking positions to market, which the banks believed was 
necessary.60 Nevertheless, the Brazilian banks, themselves more financialized and 
operating in a more financialized market, could either partially insulate themselves 
through hedging, or actively exploit the market weakness to which their selling 
contributed. Brazil was forced to turn to the IMF as private markets would not 
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provide financing at a far lower debt to GDP ratio than Turkey reached in 2001 (see 
figure 1 above), and Lebanon was able to continue borrowing with even higher 
indebtedness.  
 
Additional Events 
 
Other periods in both Lebanon and Turkey further demonstrate the impact of bank 
and individual investors. Mauro et al. (2006) note the historical importance of war in 
weakening bond markets, but Lebanon’s government bond market did not suffer 
major weakness during the Israeli invasion that started in July 2006 
(Schimmelpfennig and Gardner, 2008; see also figure 2 above). In Turkey, individual 
investors acted in a similar fashion during serious market weakness in 1994 to the 
behaviour described above.61  
 
A further example from 2003, when the Turkish parliament rejected the United 
States’ request to use Turkey for the invasion of Iraq, is worth quoting at length: 
 
[Foreign investors] were…saying, they’re going to default in three 
months…They’re all short…so here’s this big speculative attack…But the guy 
on the street thinks…these are some pretty good yields…They directly bought 
the auctions…[I]t also helped that the government…rejected the troops and 
within that weekend they passed the budget…and …you got this retail wall of 
money…buying T-bills, they [the international investors with short positions] 
had no chance. So it reversed very quickly’.62 
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This is another example of a situation where a potential crisis did not occur. 
Government policy decisions are important to these outcomes, but also of central 
importance are the potential investors in government debt, and their investment 
attitudes. The involvement of less-financialized domestic banks and individuals as 
investors is a positive for the government’s ability to raise financing and to avoid or 
manage financial crisis. Crisis is, as a result, less likely and less severe.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This study demonstrates how the increased financialization of financial market actors 
and government bond market structure can undermine debt sustainability and increase 
debt intolerance by increasing borrowing costs and the likelihood and severity of debt 
crises. This reduces governments’ capacity to increase expenditure. This concluding 
section addresses two further questions, regarding the generalizability of these 
conclusions and their implications, both for government policy and for the focus of 
academic research. 
 
Any conclusions do not directly apply to developed world government bond markets. 
The ‘safe haven’ status of developed world government bonds increases demand at 
time of uncertainty and distinguishes developed from emerging markets. However, 
loyal investors may nevertheless increase borrowing capacity, for example in Japan. 
For other middle-income emerging countries, questions of generalizability must first 
recognize the limitations of this study, covering only three countries over a limited 
period and employing a methodology that depends heavily on interview data. Further 
 29 
research is needed, including quantitative studies of a broader range of countries. 
Nevertheless, some observations are appropriate. 
 
Schimmelpfennig and Gardner (2008, p.28) conclude that ‘it is unlikely that many 
countries could, or even should try to, replicate the Lebanese experience’, but the 
country nevertheless shows that ‘building on special circumstances to cultivate a 
dedicated investor…base helps insulate to some degree financing flows from general 
market trends’. Broadly, this study agrees with these conclusions, but its comparative 
nature suggests greater generalizability. Lebanon is indeed unique, and it is difficult to 
envisage any country being able to follow its example fully. Such high government 
indebtedness also has potentially negative economic implications. Nevertheless, as the 
Turkish case further demonstrates, the importance of patient or loyal investors in 
government bonds to the avoidance of debt crises and therefore sustainable 
government borrowing (and avoidance of the heavy economic costs of crises) is a 
conclusion with policy implications across emerging markets. At a minimum, it 
questions the warnings against a captive market for government bonds (IMF, 2003 
p.23).    
 
The size of Lebanon’s loyal investor base is the result of ’special circumstances’, but 
the IMF (2006c) shows that investors with a potentially positive impact on borrowing 
capacity (including pension funds and insurance companies) owned over 70 percent 
of the domestic debt of emerging market countries surveyed in 2005. There is also 
significant domestic ownership of notionally international debt, mainly by banks. The 
average in 2004 was 11 percent, up from 5 percent in two years. As demonstrated 
above, central to these investors’ loyalty is their financialization. A full understanding 
 30 
of borrowing capacity, therefore, requires a focus on this financialization, in addition 
to the structure of financial markets.   
 
For academic research, the main conclusion regarding understanding the impact of 
financial globalization concerns the focus of enquiry. As important as processes of 
internationalization are to IPE’s consideration of change in financial markets, 
domestic financial actors cannot be ignored, even when considering markets, such as 
foreign currency bonds, generally labeled ‘international’. As important as regulation 
and liberalization are to the study of both domestic and international financial 
markets, a focus only on changing regulation is too narrow to analyze processes of 
change in financial markets. This is arguably more significant for those concerned by 
the consequences of such change than for those convinced by the virtues of ever-
expanding financial markets. In particular, while Maxfield’s (1998) focus on different 
investor types expands the patient/impatient model of financial market actors, analysis 
needs to go further, to focus on the internal decision making of investors, the 
motivations for, and consequences of, these decisions, as well as the detailed structure 
of financial markets.                  
   
 
                                                
1 Financial year 2004/05. Singapore is anomalous, as it issues domestic debt to develop the domestic 
market rather than for borrowing purposes, and invests the proceeds abroad. 
2 For Rajan, institutional change is the emergence of ‘new entities…such as private equity firms and 
hedge funds’.  
3 EMTA surveyed 66, mainly international firms. Five Brazilian institutions participated, no Turkish 
and one Lebanese. 
4 Investment banker, London, interviewed 23 June 2006. 
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5 End September 2006. Source: Brazilian Treasury. 
www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/english/hp/public_debt_report.asp, Table 7, accessed 7 January 2007. 
6 39 interviews were conducted in London (January 2005 – February 2006) and New York (all bar one 
in May 2006). All are involved in the emerging bond market. In Brazil, 26 individuals were 
interviewed (São Paulo, Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, 29 August – 12 September 2006). 21 interviews 
took place in Lebanon (Beirut, 2 September - 12 September 2005, and one interview in London, 21 
October 2005), and in Turkey, 25 interviews (Ankara and Istanbul, 30 November – 11 December 
2005). 
7 Official, Brazilian Ministry of Finance, interviewed 6 September 2006.  
8 Foreign banker, Brazil, 29 August 2006; also foreign banker, Brazil, 4 September 2006; former 
official, Banco Central do Brazil, 29 August 2006; hedge fund manager, Brazil, 31 August 2006. 
9 Foreign banker, Brazil, 29 August 2006.; also official, BM&F, 1 September 2006; foreign banker, 
Brazil, 29 August 2006. 
10 Foreign banker, Brazil, 29 August 2006. 
11 Brazilian banker, 30 August 2006. 
12 Turkish banker, 5 December 2005. 
13 Lebanese banker, 8 September 2005. 
14 9 September 2005. 
15 Lebanese banker,12 September 2005. 
16 Turkish banker, 5 December 2005; Turkish banker, 7 December 2005, also gave the $300 million 
figure; and ‘The local banks cannot sell off everything and go flat or go short’ (Turkish banker, 7 
December 2005).  
17 Lebanese banker, 2 September 2005; Lebanese banker,9 September 2005; Lebanese banker, 12 
September 2005. 
18 Lebanese banker, 7 September 2005. 
19 Lebanese banker, 3 September 2005. Also Lebanese banker, 2 September 2005); Lebanese banker, 
12 September 2005.. 
20 Lebanese banker, 7 September 2005. 
21 Turkish banker, 6 December 2005. 
22 Lebanese banker, 8 September 2005; also Lebanese banker, 3 September 2005. 
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23 Brazilian proprietary trader, 29 August 2006. 
24 Lebanese banker, 9 September 2005; ‘local retail clients… only look how much they receive at the 
end of the maturity. So they don’t trade much’ (Foreign banker, Turkey, interviewed 7 December 
2005). 
25 ‘[R]etail…keep rolling their investments all the time’ (Investment banker, London, 22 June 2005; 
previously worked at a Turkish bank). 
26 Investment banker, London, 5 January 2005. 
27 ‘[T]his position that I’ve kept is three weeks old…that’s a long time...Nobody buys and keeps things 
for six months, a year…things change’ (Hedge fund manager, London, 23 June 2005). 
28Banker, 50 percent foreign-owned Turkish bank, 8 December 2005; also investment banker, London, 
23 June 2005. 
29 ‘[T]hey look at the relative spreads of the asset [to] liabilities, even though…the cost of liabilities can 
increase, they tend to…sit on positive spread trades’ (Investment banker, London, 22 June 2005). 
30 Banco Central do Brasil (2006 p.34), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2006). 
31 Investment banker, London, 18 February 2005); hedge fund manager, London, 23 June 2005); 
‘they’ll go short and…long and…play other things’ (Investment banker, London, 17 February 2005). 
32 Lebanese banker, 12 September 2005).  
33 Turkish banker, 8 December 2005. 
34 Brazilian banker, 29 August 2006. 
35 Turkish banker, 5 December 2005. 
36 Ibid.  
37Investment banker, London, 22 June 2005; previously worked for a Turkish bank. 
38 Turkish banker, 5 December 2005. 
39 Source: Banco Central do Brasil (2006 p.34), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (2006). 
40 Source: Banque du Liban. www.bdl.gov.lb/edata/elements.asp?Table=t5231-10. Accessed 14 
October 2009. 
41 Lebanese banker, 8 September 2005. Also (same interviewee): ‘[Y]ou bought dollars as banks, but 
you have to place them...with the Central Bank.... so you cannot take them out…it’s not they enforce 
them, but they....encourage…really strongly by persuasion and everything, otherwise they would have 
collapse[d]... and it worked’. 
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42 Gross international reserves minus principal and interest due within 12 months on central bank 
foreign currency liabilities except to the Lebanese government. 
43 Also Lebanese banker, 9 September 2005. 
44 Banque du Liban official, 8 September 2005. 
45 Lebanese banker, 9 September 2005. Also Lebanese banker, 8 September 2005; Banque du Liban 
official, 8 September 2005. 
46 Lebanese banker, 9 September 2005. 
47 Former Minister, Lebanon, 6 September 2005. 
48 On 24 March 2005 (www.moodys.com). 
49 Turkish banker, 8 December 2005; also Turkish banker, 5 December 2005. 
50 ‘[T]hat’s the kind of unity we had, locals against foreigners. Because foreigners were talking about 
the devaluation, collapse and everything’ (Foreign banker, Turkey, 5 December 2005. In 2001 the 
interviewee worked for a Turkish bank). Also Banker, foreign-owned Turkish bank, 8 December 2005. 
The bank was not foreign owned in 2001, and was one of the six banks; Turkish banker, 7 December 
2005; Turkish banker, 8 December 2005. 
51 Turkish banker, 8 December 2005. 
52 Turkish banker, 7 December 2005. 
53 An anonymous reviewer suggests another large bank profited substantially at this time, in a way 
similar to the Brazilian banks. 
54 Banker, 50 percent foreign-owned bank, Turkey, 8 December 2005. The bank was not part foreign-
owned in 2001. 
55 Turkish Banker, 7 December 2005. 
56 Ibid.. 
57 Brazilian banker, 29 August 2006. 
58 Former official, Banco Central do Brasil, 11 September 2006. 
59 Hedge fund manager, Brazil,12 September 2006; former official, Banco Central do Brasil, 11 
September 2006. 
60 Former official, Banco Central do Brasil, 11 September 2006. 
61 Turkish banker, 6 December 2005. 
62 Research Analyst, London, 23 June 2005. 
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62 Fund management researcher, London, 14 February 2006. 
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Table 1. General Comparison between the Countries (end 2006 unless stated). 
 
 Brazil Lebanon Turkey 
GDP (US$ Billion) 1,067 23 402 
Population (Million) 189,323 4,055 72,975 
GNI per capita 2007, 
PPP (US$) 
9,510 10,910 12,970 
Rating (S&P) BB+ B- BB- 
Government domestic 
debt to GDP (%) 
58.5 85.7 50.2 
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Government 
international debt to 
GDP (%) 
8.8 88.9 17.8 
EMBI Weighting 2004 
(%) 
19.01 1.12 6.22 
Size of domestic bond 
market (US$ billion 
eq.) 
467 19 171 
Average assets of 10 
largest banks (US$ 
Bn) 
57.562 25.162 5.462 
Bank Assets to GDP 
(%) 
73.7 259 89.5 
Sources: World Bank, S&P, JP Morgan, Central 
Banks and National Treasuries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Net Public Debt to GDP 1996-2006 
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Source: IMF reports 
Figure 2. EMBI Country Components US$ Yields 1998-2007 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table 2. Investor Involvement in Domestic Bond Markets 
 Lebanon Turkey Brazil 
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Domestic 
Commercial 
Banks 
Very high 
involvement. Own 
79.4%.  
High involvement. Own 
37.3%.62 
High involvement. Own 
43.2%. 
Domestic 
Individuals 
Involved. Probably 
own 20%.62 
Involved. Own 
approximately 25%.62 
Not involved. Own 0.16%. 
Domestic Mutual 
Funds 
Not involved. Low involvement. Mutual 
and pension funds own 
5.7%.62 
High involvement. Including 
pension and hedge funds, 
own 50.0%. 
Domestic Pension 
Funds 
Not involved. Low involvement. High involvement. 
Domestic Hedge 
Funds 
Not involved. Not involved. High involvement. 
International 
Investors 
Not involved. Involved. Own 18.4%. Low involvement. Own 
about 2%.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Investor Involvement in International Bond Markets 
 
 Lebanon Turkey Brazil 
Domestic 
Commercial 
Banks 
Very high 
involvement. Own 
77.2%. 
High involvement. Own 
34.4%. 
Involved. Uncertain, but 
probably own less than 20%. 
Domestic 
Individuals 
Involved. Probably 
own 10--20%.62 
Involved. Own 6.8%.62 Not involved.  
Domestic Mutual 
Funds 
Not involved. Low involvement. All 
domestic institutional 
investors own 2.6%. 
Low involvement. Some 
foreign currency 
denominated mutual funds. 
Domestic Pension 
Funds 
Not involved. Low involvement. Not involved. 
Domestic Hedge 
Funds 
Not involved. Not involved. Low involvement. 
International 
Investors 
Not involved. High involvement. Own 
over 50%. 
High involvement. Probably 
own 60--75%. 
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